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COMMENTS
LEWIS V. BTIM:
STATE REGULATION, THE BANK HOLDING
COMPANY ACT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The federal and state governments traditionally have shared the
regulation of banking in the United States.1 Both sovereignties oversee
banking by a coordinated scheme of statutes and regulations under
which financial institutions may operate by state charter or as national
banks.2 Under the "dual banking system,' '3 the balance of power between
state and federal governments exists within the constitutional restraints
of the commerce clause." Recently, the United States Supreme Court in
Lewis v. Bankers Trust Investment Managers, Inc.5 determined that a
Florida statute prohibiting entry into the state by a bank holding com-
pany subsidiary violated the commerce clause.'
Florida Statutes section 659.141(1)1 barred the acquisition or owner-
ship by a bank holding company of any business organization in Florida
which furnished investment advisory services.' The Lewis Court held
I Hablutzel, State Regulation of Branch Banking, 16 DuQ. L. REV. 679, 679 (1977),
[hereinafter cited as Hablutzel]; Hackely, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REv. 565,
565-80 (1966); see McCullouch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400-37 (1819).
2 Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Scott]; Hablutzel, supra note 1, at 679-80. National
banks are organized under the authority of the Comptroller of the Currency. 12 U.S.C. §§
21-42 (1976). States also have power to crdate banking institutions. See, e.g., VA. CODE §§
6.1-5-6.1-15 (1979).
3 Scott, supra note 2, at 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause empowers Congress to regulate in-
terstate trade. Id.; see text accompanying notes 5, 18-33 infra; Scott, supra note 2, at 15.
5 100 S. Ct. 2009 (1980).
1 Id. at 2019. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHC Act) defines "banking
holding company" as an organization having control over any bank or any other bank
holding company. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1976). "Control" includes ownership or power to
vote 35% or more of any class of voting stock, control in any manner of the election of a
majority of directors or trustees, or any direct or indirect controlling influence over the
management or policies of any bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(al(2)(A)-(C) (1976). Ownership or
power to vote less than 5% of any class of voting stock, however, raises a presumption that
the organization does not have control. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(3) (1976). Ownership of stock in a
bona fide fiduciary capacity is not considered in determining bank holding company status.
12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(5) (1976). Under the BHC Act, control over a single bank will qualify a
company as a bank holding company. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a).
7 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.141(1) (West Supp. 1980); 1972 FLA. LAWS, C. 72-726, §§ 1-7.
8 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.141(1) (West Supp. 1980). Section 659.141(1) provided that no
bank or bank holding company whose operations were principally conducted outside Florida
could acquire or control any business organization in Florida which conducted investment
advisory services. Id. The statute defined investment advisory services as the business of
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that section 659.141(1) discriminated against out-of-state bank holding
companies,9 burdened interstate commerce," and was invalid under the
commerce clause." In additon, the Lewis Court found that the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHC Act)2 did not grant states the power
to prohibit entry of a bank holding company into the local investment ad-
visory service market."
In 1972, Bankers Trust Investment Managers, Inc., (BTIM) was in-
corporated in Delaware by Bankers Trust New York Corporation, a bank
holding company. BTIM proposed to open an investment advisory ser-
vice office in Palm Beach, Florida, and petitioned the Federal Reserve
Board for permission. 4 The Board denied the request on the ground that
BTIM's proposal violated section 659.141(1)."5 In a subsequent federal
suit, a three-judge district court granted injunctive relief and
declaratory judgment on behalf of BTIM. 1 On appeal by Florida, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed. 7
Florida argued that section 659.141(1) was a legitimate exercise of
state power" and that BHC Act permitted the state to regulate non-
counselling persons for compensation concerning the value of securities or advisability of
investment in securities. "Bank holding company" was defined in § 659.141(2)(a) as any
business organization that controlled any bank or trust company and principally conducted
its business outside of Florida. See note 6 supra. During the pendency of Lewis on appeal,
the Florida legislature repealed § 659.141, effective July 1, 1980. 100 S. Ct. at 2024. The
Florida legislature proposed other regulations on bank holding company activities during
1980. See Sadler & Walters, Effects of Competition on Banking Law in the 1980's, 54 FLA.
B.J. 36, 37-38 (1980).
100 S. Ct. at 2018.
" Id at 2019.
1 Id.
1 Banking Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1849 (1976).
11 100 S. Ct. at 2021.
14 Bankers Trust New York Corporation, 59 FED. RES. BULL. 364 (1973) (seeking
authorization to conduct non-banking activity of investment advisory services under §
225.4(b)(1) of Federal Reserve Board Regulation 4). Federal Reserve Board regulations
specifically define investment services in the context of bank holding company non-banking
activities. 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.4(a)(5), 225.125 (1980). Pursuant to the BHC Act, advisory ser-
vices are included on the Federal Reserve Board's list of permissible non-banking activities.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.4(a)(5), 225.123, 225.125, 225.126 (1980). Con-
gress has statutorily defined investment advisor as any person who, under a contract, fur-
nishes advice with respect to the desirability of investing in, purchasing or selling securities
or other property. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20) (1976). Excepted from this definition are advisors
writing for uniform publications, fiduciaries and persons providing only statistical or factual
information. Id.
'5 59 FED. RES. BULL. 364, 365 (1973).
16 BT Investment Managers, Inc. v. Lewis, 461 F. Supp. 1187, 1188 (1978).
100 S. Ct. at 2009. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding that §
659.141(1) violated the commerce clause. Id. The Court, however, substituted the Pike
balancing test for the "per se rule of invalidity" which the district court had applied. Id. at
2017-19; see text accompanying notes 26-33 infra.
5 Congress has power under the commerce clause to regulate banking as an element
of interstate commerce. See 100 S. Ct. at 2015; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 424 (1819). The commerce clause limits state power to burden interstate commerce. 100
S. Ct. at 2015; Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978). Absent
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banking activities of bank holding companies." The Supreme Court first
addressed the issue whether the Florida statute acted to discriminate
against out-of-state bank holding companies in violation of the commerce
clause . 2 The Court then considered whether the BHC Act granted to the
states the power to prohibit acquisition of in-state investment advisory
services by out-of-state bank holding companies. 2' Applying a two-step
approach,2 the Supreme Court reasoned that even if the Florida statute
were invalid under the commerce clause, Florida could regulate out-of-
state bank holding companies if Congress had specifically granted this
regulatory power to the states in the BHC Act.' The Court found section
659.141(1) constitutionally invalid 2 and rested its analysis on the BHC
preemptive federal legislation the states may to a limited extent regulate matters of
legitimate local concern even though such regulation burdens interstate commerce. H. P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949). Florida asserted as state concerns
an interest in discouraging undue economic concentration in the "arena of high finance", a
desire to protect local residents from fraud through regulation of financial practices, and an
aim to maximize local control over locally based financial activities. 100 S. Ct. at 2019; see
text accompanying notes 30-33 infra.
" 100 S. Ct. at 2020; see text accompanying notes 34-36 infra.
Id. at 2015. At trial, BTIM also claimed that § 659.141(1) violated due process and
equal protection. 461 F. Supp. at 1191 n.4 (1978). The district court rejected these conten-
tions and the Supreme Court did not address them on appeal. 100 S.Ct. at 2014-15.
21 100 S. Ct. at 2015; see notes 42-47 infra.
' 100 S. Ct. at 2014-15, 2017-22. The Lewis Court constructed a two-step analysis of
the Florida statute's constitutional validity under the commerce clause. Id. at 2015, 2019. In
the first step the Court assessed whether § 659.141(1) impermissibly burdened interstate
commerce. Id at 2015-19; see text accompanying notes 27-30 infra. After finding that the
state statute imposed an excessive burden on interstate commerce, the Court examined
whether the BHC Act specifically granted to the states power to regulate certain non-
banking activities of bank holding companies. Id. at 2020. Congress may grant to the states
power to regulate matters in interstate commerce. Id.; International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945) (federal statute permitted state to require employer
contributions to unemployment compensation program). Where Congress has specifically
granted regulatory power to the states, the states may regulate elements of interstate com-
merce to a greater extent than the commerce clause would allow. See H. P. Hood & Sons,
Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 542 (1949) (state milk licensing regulations did not coincide
with or supplement federal regulations). Thus, the commerce clause permits Congress
both to preempt state legislation involving interstate commerce and to grant the states ad-
ditional regulatory power. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 423-25, 427-31
(1946) (federal statute expressly permitted state taxation and regulation of interstate in-
surance companies); see text accompanying notes 55-60 infra. The Lewis Court's two-step
approach combined the grant of power issue with the traditional commerce clause analysis.
See 100 S. Ct. at 2015-20; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335-38 (1979); Hunt v.
Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n., 432 U.S. 333, 348-54 (1977); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-77 (1976); see generally P. BENSON, The Supreme Court and
the Commerce Clause, 1937-1970, 277-317 (1970) (discussing the conflict of federal and state
regulation under the commerce clause).
' 100 S. Ct. at 2019-20. An examination of the validity of a state statute under the
commerce clause and of a congressional grant of regulatory power to the states presumes
that preemptive federal legislation does not exist. Id. at 2015; see, e.g., H. P. Hood & Sons,
Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 542-45 (1949); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408,
423-25, 427-31 (1946); text accompanying note 22 supra.
2 100 S. Ct. at 2019; see text accompanying notes 26-33 infra.
1981]
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Act's regulatory scheme."
In finding that the Florida statute violated the commerce clause, the
Court rejected the trial court's use of the "per se rule of invalidity." 6
Instead, the Supreme Court applied the balancing test announced in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.'7 Under the Pike balancing test, the Court
found that Florida's interest in asserting local control over investment
advisory services did not justify the burden placed on out-of-state bank
holding companies by the statute.' In comparison, the per se rule of in-
validity provides that a state statute violates the commerce clause
where the legislation effects "simple economic protectionism."'  By
substituting the Pike standard for the per se rule, the Court accepted
Florida's assertion that state regulation of out-of-state bank holding com-
panies was not protectionistic 0 The Court's use of the Pike balancing
test suggests that the states have legitimate state interests which
100 S. Ct. at 2019-21; see text accompanying notes 34-47 infra.
100 S. Ct. at 2016-18; accord, Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). A
New Jersey statute prohibited importation of most solid and liquid wastes which originated
outside the state. Id. at 618-19. After finding that garbage was within the meaning of in-
terstate commerce, the Philadelphia Court held the New Jersey statute constitutionally in-
valid. Id. at 629. The Supreme Court in Philadelphia reasoned that where state legislation
affecting interstate commerce was simply economic protectionism, a per se rule of constitu-
tional invalidity existed under the commerce clause. Id. at 624. The Philadelphia Court
described the nation as a single economic unit and invalidated state regulation that attemp-
ted to place a state in economic isolation. Id. at 624-27; see H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond,
Inc., 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949).
2? 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). In Pike, a produce company raised cantaloupes in Arizona,
but packaged them in a California plant located 31 miles away. Id. at 130. The Pike Court
recognized that an impermissible burden on interstate commerce was a matter of degree
and balanced the nature of the local interest concerned against the less burdensome alter-
natives. Id. at 142. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's permanent injunction
against a state order that prohibited transportation of the fruit out-of-state for packaging.
1 100 S. Ct. at 2016-19. The Lewis Court found that the Florida statute directly
burdened interstate commerce. Id. at 2019; see Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970) (distinguishing between direct and indirect burdens on interstate commerce); Dean
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349,354 (1951); text accompanying note 27 supra. The Pike stan-
dard compares whether the interstate commerce burden is only incidental against whether
the state statute even-handedly effects a legitimate local public interest. The question is one
of the degree and will depend upon whether the same interest could be promoted as well
with less impact on interstate commerce. 397 U.S. at 142.
1 See 100 S. Ct. at 2018-19; notes 8, 15 & 18 supra. See generally Keeffe & Head,
What Is Wrong With the American Banking System and What To Do About It 36 MD. L.
REV. 788 (1977).
a 100 S. Ct. at 2018-19. The district court's commerce clause analysis rested on a find-
ing that the Florida statute was parochial and intended to erect exclusionary economic bar-
riers. 461 F. Supp. at 1194. The Supreme Court accepted the district court's characteriza-
tion of § 659.141(1) as "parochial," but refused to apply the per se rule. Id. at 2017; see
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); notes 31-33 infra. The Court applied
another established commerce clause standard. 100 S. Ct. at 2015-16; cf. Dean Milk Co. v.
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1951) (least restrictive alternative test of commerce clause in-
validity); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (balancing test for determining
whether state interests justified resulting burden on interstate commerce).
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permit some regulation of bank holding companies."1 Section 659.141(1),
however, discriminated among bank holding companies on the basis of
their place of origin. 2 The Court concluded that the burden on the free
flow of interstate commerce imposed upon out-of-state bank holding com-
panies outweighed the state interests protected by the regulation.'
After deciding that the commerce clause invalidated section
659.141(1) under the Pike standard, the Court addressed the question
whether the BHC Act granted Florida power to regulate a bank holding
company's non-banking activities.' Section 4 of the BHC Act generally
prohibits a bank holding company from acquiring non-banking business
enterprises.' One exception to the non-banking prohibitions is section
4(c)(8),3 6 which permits bank holding company acquisition of business
endeavors "closely related to banking.3 7 Similarly, section 3 limits the
81 100 S. Ct. at 2019. The Lewis court acknowledged that discouraging economic con-
centration and protecting the citizenry against fraud were legitimate state interests. Id.;
see note 18 supra.
I Id at 2018. Florida argued that Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117
(1978), permitted the state indirectly to burden interstate commerce by regulating the
organization of out-of-state business entities. Id. at 2017. In Exxon, the Supreme Court
upheld a Maryland statute regulating ownership of retail gasoline outlets by petroleum
refiners on the ground that the statute placed a discriminatory burden on interstate com-
merce. 437 U.S. at 126; see 100 S. Ct. at 2018; note 8 supra. The Lewis court distinguished
Exxon and found that the Florida statute discriminated against out-of-state bank holding
companies on the ground of their place of origin rather than their organizational structure.
Id. at 2017-18.
' 100 S. Ct. at 2019; see Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 126
(1978); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 542 (1949); note 32 supra. The Lewis
Court recognized a compelling state concern in banking and similar financial activities but
asserted that banking is a matter of interstate commerce within Congress' regulatory
power. 100 S. Ct. at 2016-17 n.7; see Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329, 335 (1979) (bait
minnows marketed out-of-state are in interstate commerce); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v.
Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978) (double-trailer trucks used to transport goods on highways are
in interstate commerce); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370 (1976) (milk
marketed across state lines is in interstate commerce); Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 441-42 (1960) (cleaning fires of steamships in harbor is within in-
terstate commerce powers of Congress even though such powers not exercised).
' 100 S. Ct. at 2019-20. Florida asserted that § 3(d) of the BHC Act granted to the
states the power to prohibit acquisition by out-of-state bank holding companies of in-state
non-banking activities described under § 4(c)(8). Id. at 2020; see text accompanying notes
23-25 supra.
- 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1976). Section 4(a) prohibits acquisition by a bank holding company
of direct or indirect control over any company not a bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1976). The
BHC Act controls acquisition of banks and banking interests under § 3. 12 U.S.C. § 1842
(1976); see text accompanying note 47 infra.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976). Subsection (c)(8) specifically excepts from the general
non-banking prohibition of § 4 any bank holding company interest in activities "closely
related to banking." See 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1980); text accompanying note 37 infra. Other ex-
ceptions to § 4 include activities incident to the operation of a bank, interests in non-banking
companies held in good faith in a fiduciary capacity, and interests in investment companies
holding no more than 5% of any non-banking company. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1976).
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.4, 225.123 (1980); see P. HELLER, Hand-
book of Federal Bank Holding Company Law, 259-81 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HELLER];
Frey, Bank Holding Companies and Nonbank Activities, 1978 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 209, 221,
1981]
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organizational and banking activities of bank holding companies." Under
section 3(d) a bank holding company may not acquire a bank located out-
side the state in which the holding company principally conducts
business, unless the target state permits such acquisition by statute."
Florida asserted in Lewis that the section 3(d) grant of power to
permit bank acquisitions, when read with the "closely related to bank-
ing" language in section 4(c)(8), constituted a grant of power to the states
to prohibit in-state non-banking acquisition by out-of-state holding com-
panies." The Supreme Court rejected Florida's argument and found no
congressional authorization to the states in section 4(c)(8) parallel to the
power in section 3(d).41 Furthermore, ordinary canons of interpretation
would not permit an inference that the state powers enumerated in
225 (1978). Once the Federal Reserve Board has determined that a proposed activity is
"closely related to banking," the Board must ascertain whether the activity is for the public
benefit. See, e.g., NCNB Corp. v. Board of Govs., 599 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979) (bank holding
company appealed Federal Reserve Board's refusal to allow subsidiary to continue in-
surance activities); Bankamerica Corp. v. Board of Govs., 596 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1979) (bank
holding company sought permission to expand non-banking activities of data-processing sub-
sidiary); Citicorp v. Board of Govs., 589 F.2d 1182 (2d Cir. 1979) (bank holding company ap-
pealed Federal Reserve Board's refusal to allow continuation of subsidiary's mortgage bank-
ing activities, where subsidiary was nation's second largest mortgage banking company);
National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Govs., 516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (court reviewed
Federal Reserve Board regulation permitting courier transportation services by bank
holding company subsidiary); 12 C.F.R. 225.4 (1980).
The Lewis Court did not address any of the antitrust issues arising out of federal
regulation of interstate bank holding company activities. See, e.g., McHatton, The Bank
Holding Company and the Sherman Act. The Validity of Cooperation Among Commonly
Held Banks, 18 ARIZ. L. Rav. 147, 162 (1976).
12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1976). Section 3 requires Federal Reserve Board approval prior to
any bank holding company banking acquisition of more than 5/0 of a banking institution or
any attempted merger. Id. Section 3(c) provides standards for approval of each acquisition.
See Board of Govs. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 242-52 (1978); HELLER. supra
note 37, at 75-153.
, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1976); see 100 S. Ct. at 2021; Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New
Orleans, 379 U.S. 411, 419, 424 (1965); HELLER, supra note 37, at 272-74.
"O 100 S. Ct. at 2020-21. Section 3(d) of the BHC Act provides that the Federal Reserve
Board may approve acquisition of banks by out-of-state bank holding companies where the
target state gives clear, expressed statutory authority for that acquisition. Section 4(c)(8)
removes non-banking activities closely related to banking from the general prohibition of §
4. See notes 36 & 37 supra. Neither party in Lewis asserted that § 3 or § 4 preempted state
regulation of non-banking activities. Id. at 2015. Failure to argue federal preemption sug-
gests that the parties assumed that the states retained power to regulate permissible non-
banking activities. The Court stated that § 7 reserves to the states the right to exercise
powers and jurisdiction existing at the time the BHC Act became effective. 100 S. Ct. at
2022; 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1976); see notes 45 and 70-72 infra.
" 100 S. Ct. at 2021. The Court rejected Florida's assertion that non-banking activities
excluded from § 4 came within the regulatory scope of any other provisions of the BHC Act.
Id. Federal regulation of non-banking activities, however, is limited to a determination of
their excludability under § 4(c)(8). See 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1980); text accompanying notes
42-45 infra. See generally 12 C.F.R. Chapter II, Part 225 (1980).
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section 3(d) encompassed non-banking activities under section 4(c)(8). 42
Section 3(d) refers only to banking activities and does not expressly
regulate the non-banking activities excluded from section 441 Section
4(c)(8) merely excludes closely related non-banking activities from the
section 4 prohibitions.44 The BHC Act does not appear to regulate the
non-banking activities excluded from section 4.45 The Supreme Court in
Lewis concluded that section 3(d) of the BHC Act, therefore, did not
grant to the states any regulatory power over the non-banking activities
of out-of-state bank holding companies.
4 1
In determining that section 3(d) of the BHC Act does not apply to
closely related non-banking activities, the Lewis Court stated that sec-
tion 4 regulated these activities.4 1 Section 4, however, enumerates only
those activities specifically prohibited to bank holding companies.
4
1
Federal Reserve Board regulations promulgated under section 4 merely
provide procedures and standards to determine premissible non-banking
activities."9 Non-banking activities excepted under section 4(c)(8) are
regulated at the holding company level only under the limited adminis-
trative provisions of section 5.50 During the 1970 hearings to amend
100 S. Ct. at 2021. The Court failed to define the term "ordinary canons of interpre-
tation." See text accompanying note 45 infra. Under the Lewis Court's analysis, the BHC
Act creates three categories of bank holding company activities: banking (§ 3), prohibited
non-banking (§ 4), and excepted closely-related-to-banking activities (§ 4(c)(8)). The last
category logically includes other exceptions to § 4 prohibitions. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1976).
The BHC Act statutory scheme and the Federal Reserve Board regulations suggest only
two categories, banking and non-banking activities. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842 and 1843 (1976); 12
C.F.R. Chapter II, Part 225 (1980); see HELLER, supra note 37, at 53, 75, 157, 229; note 45 in-
fra. The Lewis Court's analysis appears to create a gap between the banking and non-
banking provisions of the BHC Act. The § 4(c)(8) closely related non-banking activities fall
into this gap.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1976); 100 S. Ct. at 2021.
" 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1976); see text accompanying note 42 supra, note 45 infra.
,5 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1976). Florida argued in Lewis that state power to regulate bank
holding company activities derived from § 3(d) and § 7 of the BHC Act. 100 S. Ct. at 2020;
see also text accompanying notes 49-55 infra. Section 7 reserves to the states a general
power to regulate bank holding companies. Id. at 2022; 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1976). The Lewis
court held that the commerce clause limited any state regulatory power under § 7 and re-
jected Florida's assertion that the general language of § 7 constituted a Congressional grant
of power to the state to regulate non-banking activities under § 4(c)(8). 100 S. Ct. at 2022; see
note 85 infra.
,1 100 S. Ct. at 2021; see 12 C.F.R. § 225.3 (1980); text accompanying notes 42 & 45
supra.
' 100 S. Ct. at 2021.
12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1976). Section 4 generally prohibits any non-banking activity of a
bank holding company, subject to the exceptions given in § 4(c). Id. § 1843(c); see text accom-
panying notes 42 & 45 sup. a.
"9 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1980). See generally Comment, Implementation of the Bank
Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970: The Scope of Banking Activities, 71 MICH. L.
REV. 1170, 1188-1210 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Scope of Banking].
12 U.S.C. § 1844 (1976 & Supp. H 1978). The Federal Reserve Board derives general
regulatory authority from § 5 of the BHC Act. Id. Section 5(b) authorizes the Federal
1981]
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section 4(c)(8), Congress apparently assumed that the Federal Reserve
Board regulated the conduct of non-banking activities by bank holding
companies." Notwithstanding the Federal Reserve Board's limited
regulatory authority, the Supreme Court rested its analysis on sections
3(d) and 4(c)(8) rather than attempting to reconcile concurrent state and
federal regulatory interests, as reflected in section 5.5' Although the
Court considered Lewis primarily as a commerce clause case,' the BHC
Act analysis will affect the system of bank holding company regulation."
The Court's narrow interpretation of Florida's regulatory power
under section 3(d) contrasts with the less restrictive standard applied to
situations where preemption of state law by fedeal statute is at issue.,
The Supreme Court has stated the principle that federal commercial
regulation should not preempt state regulatory power without "per-
suasive reasons."' The Court has recognized the unmistakable intent of
Congress as a persuasive reason to permit federal preemption of a state
regulation." Where the subject matter of a regulation permits no other
solution to the conflict between state and federal authority, federal
preemption is also appropriate. 8 The Court seeks to reconcile the opera-
tion of conflicting federal and state statutory schemes rather than
Reserve Board to issue regulations necessary to enable administration of the BHC Act and
prevent evasion of the Act's purposes. Id. § 1844(b). Section 5(e)(1) empowers the Federal
Reserve Board to order termination of non-banking activities that threaten the financial
security of a bank subsidiary. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(e(1) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (as amended by
Act of Nov. 9, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, Title I, § 105(a), 92 Stat. 3646). The Federal Reserve
Board's comprehensive regulation of bank holding company organization derives specifically
from statutory authority in § 3. Id. § 1842. The Lewis Court, however, held that § 3 does not
apply to non-banking activities. 100 S. Ct. at 2021.
1 H.R. REP. No. 91-1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 19, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 5561, 5564; 12 U.S.C. § 1843(cX8) (1976). Section 4(e)(8) was amended by
Congress to expand the scope of the closely-related-to-banking exception to include most ac-
tivities closely related to banking. Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, Title I, § 103, 84
Stat. 1763; see Scope of Banking, supra note 49, at 1170; text accompanying notes 36, 37 &
43 supra.
1 100 S. Ct. at 2019-21; see Scott, supra note 2, at 14-18. The Court's commerce clause
analysis balanced federal and state interests in a constitutional context. 100 S. Ct. at 2019.
Balancing of federal and state regulatory powers raises the issue of preemption by federal
statute, to which different standards apply. See text accompanying notes 55-60 infra.
100 S. Ct. at 2015.
See text accompanying notes 67-89 infra.
See 100 S. Ct. at 2015; text accompanying notes 56-61 infra.
Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). Florida
challenged a California agricultural regulation which effectively barred the importation of
Florida-grown avocadoes. The Supreme Court failed to find the California regulation in
violation of the commerce clause and held that federal regulations did not preempt the state
statute. Id. at 152.
17 Id.; see text accompanying note 59 infra.
373 U.S. at 142. During debate on the BHC Act in 1956, Congress added subsection
3(d) to prevent use of the bank holding company structure to avoid state regulation of
branch banking. 100 S. Ct. at 2021; H. R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5 (1955); see 12
U.S.C. § 36 (1976).
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finding one invalid.59 Since neither party in Lewis claimed that the BHC
Act preempted the Florida statute, the Court did not apply the lower
preemption standards to the issue of a statutory grant of powers to the
states.'0
When compared to statutes adopted in other states, Florida section
659.141(1) is more discriminatory against out-of-state bank holding com-
panies. 1 Virginia and New York, for example, provide for registration of
bank holding companies and permit governmental interference with
their operation only in the event of improper activities or financial irre-
sponsibility.62 California also allows its banking officials to inspect
financial records and to require reports of bank holding company
organization. 3 Georgia has empowered the Banking Commission to deny
registration to bank holding companies whose organization or activities
would result in a monopoly of banking business, tend to lessen competi-
tion, or be in restraint of trade.64 In contrast, North Carolina has no
specific statutory provisions for bank holding companies. 5 Since section
659.141(1) is unduly discriminatory, the Supreme Court in the future may
limit the holding in Lewis to its facts. A narrow reading of Lewis will
enable states to regulate bank holding companies without interfering
"1 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127, 139 (1973).
The Supreme Court enunciated a policy to reconcile the operation of both the federal and
state statutory schemes without holding one completely ousted. See generally Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v.
Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 722 (1963).
1 100 S. Ct. at 2015; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117,
127 (1973). A voluntarily terminated investment counsellor alleged that a California
securities regulation was preempted by federal regulation of the New York stock exchange.
Id. at 119-20. In finding that the federal regulation did not preempt the state regulation, the
Court sought to reconcile the operation of the state and federal regulations. Id at 127-39.
The policy of reconciliation announced in Merrill Lynch suggests that state regulation
should remain in force unless clearlypreempted by federal statute and policy. Id; Florida
Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963); see text accompanying
notes 56-59 supra. The Lewis Court did not address the issue whether federal administra-
tive regulations can be preemptive of state statutes.
61 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.141(1) (West Supp. 1980). Pennsylvania and Illinois, for ex-
ample, prohibit activities by any business organization structured as a bank holding com-
pany, although both states permit investment advisory services. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §
6003 (Purdon) (1967). Similarly, Title 7, § 1-102(j) of the Uniform Securities Act provides for
registration of investment advisors. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 161/z, § 73 (Smith-Hurd 1960 and
Supp. 1980). Chapter 1211/-, § 137.8 A. and D. of the Illinois Code provide for information
disclosures and registration of investment advisors.
" VA. CODE § 6.1-381 & 6.1-381.3 (1979); N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 141.5 and 142, 36-6-2
(McKinney Supp. 1979).
' CAL. FiN. CODE §§ 3700,3703,3704 (West Supp. 1979); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25009,25230,
25232 (West 1968) (regulations of investment advisory services); see Title 10, CAL. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 260.236 and 260.240 et seq. (qualifications and administrative regulations for invest-
ment advisors).
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 13-207, 13-207.1(a)(1)-(6), 13-207.1(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1980).
See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. Chapters 53 (Banks) or 55 (Business Corporations)
(1979). Section 72A-2 does not require registration of investment advisors.
1981]
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with federal regulation under the BHC Act, unless the state statute
violates the commerce clause under the Pike balancing test.6
Lewis was a case of first impression before the Supreme Court on
the issue of the states' power to regulate bank holding company activi-
ties under sections 3(d) and 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act. 7 The interpretation of
the BHC Act in Lewis will have considerable impact on the federal-state
regulatory scheme if the Court follows Lewis literally.68 The Lewis
Court held that section 3(d) granted limited power to the states to
permit bank holding company expansion into the state only where the
BHC Act otherwise prohibits interstate branching. 9 Although recogniz-
ing that section 3(d) applies exclusively to banking activities, the Court
expressed doubt that the section authorized the states to prohibit any
bank holding company activities. ° The holding in Lewis may affect
existing state statutes which restrict the banking activities of bank
holding companies, such as those that affirmatively prohibit all bank
holding company activities. 1 Under a broad reading of Lewis, these
statutes exceed the power granted to the states by section 3(d).7"
11 See 100 S. Ct. at 2017. The Court's substitution of the Pike balancing test for the per
se rule in determining that Florida's statute violated the commerce clause suggests that
legitimate state interests exist in regulating bank holding company activities. See id. at
2015. Under Lewis, state statutes that do not burden interstate commerce in violation of
the Pike balancing test are not constitutionally invalid under the commerce clause. Id at
2019. The Lewis Court held that state regulation of bank holding companies under § 3(d) of
the BHC Act may only create an exception to federal restriction on interstate branching. Id-
at 2021; see 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1976). Similarly, the Court determined that non-banking ac-
tivities are regulated under § 4 of the BHC Act. Id.; see text accompanying notes 47 & 48
supra. After Lewis the Federal Reserve Board may view the Court's interpretation of § 3(d)
and § 4 as preemptive of state regulatory power.
I Other cases under § 4(c) have considered whether a closely-related-to-banking activity
can qualify under § 4(c) to escape the § 4(a) prohibition on non-banking activities. See note 37
supra. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1980).
" See 100 S. Ct. at 2021. The Lewis Court unambiguously interpreted sections 3 and 4
of the BHC Act with respect to powers delegated to the states. Id The Court stated
without limitation that § 3(d) authorizes no state restriction of bank holding company ac-
tivities and that § 4 regulates non-banking activities independently. Id
" Id. The Court said it is "doubtful" that § 3(d) authorizes state restrictions "of any
nature" on bank holding company activities. Id
70 Id The Court carefully distinguished between the prohibitionary nature of the
Florida statute and the "permits" language in § 3(d), which limits the grant of power to ex-
pressed prohibition by states of interstate bank branching by bank holding companies. Id.;
see 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1976); FLA. STAT. § 659.141(1) (Supp. 1979). The Florida statute ex-
pressed the bank holding company regulation in explicitly prohibitionary language. The
Lewis Court interpreted "permits" in § 3(d) to authorize the states only to create exceptions
to the general federal restriction on interstate bank branching of bank holding companies.
Id at 2021; 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1976).
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 6003 (Purdon) (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 161/2, § 73 (Smith-
Hurd 1960 & Supp. 1980).
7 The bank holding company statutes of both Pennsylvania and Illinois prohibited any
action by a business organization that would qualify it as a bank holding company or any ac-
tion to merge or consolidate with a bank holding company. See note 71 supra. Furthermore,
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State statutes that regulate but do not generally prohibit bank
holding company activity may also exceed the authority given by section
3(d). 3 Georgia's statute grants the Banking Commission power to
prohibit any monopolistic or anticompetitive bank holding company ac-
tivities."4 Under the commerce clause analysis in Lewis, these restric-
tions potentially burden interstate commerce even more than a blanket
prohibition which applies uniformly to in-state and out-of-state bank
holding companies.7" Read broadly, Lewis bars comprehensive state
regulation of the banking and non-banking activities of bank holding
companies.
If the Supreme Court elects to apply its interpretation of the BHC
Act in Lewis strictly, the present state-federal balance in banking
regulation may change.7' Federal Reserve Board regulation of bank
holding company activities at the holding company organization level is
limited 77 and generally has been supplemented by state regulations
reflecting the economic and financial climate of the individual states.
78
After Lewis, states may not regulate the non-banking activities of bank
holding companies in a way that unduly burdens interstate commerce.
79
Comprehensive federal regulation, however, does not yet exist.
In March, 1980, Congress passed the Depository Institutions Deregu-
lation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.81 The statute relaxed many ex-
the purpose of both state statutes is to maintain competitive banking and protect the in-
dependence of small banks. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 6002 (Purdon) (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 161/2, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1960 & Supp. 1980).
" The Lewis Court first considered whether the state statute unduly burdened inter-
state commerce in violation of the Pike balancing test. 100 S. Ct. at 2015. State restrictions
on bank holding company activities that are invalid under Pike are not authorized by sec-
tions 3(d), 4, or 7 of the BHC Act. Id. at 2021-22. Notwithstanding the general reservation of
power to the states in § 7, the Lewis Court limited state regulation under that section to the
boundaries of the commerce clause. I&L at 2022; see text accompanying notes 34-35, 42-45
supra, note 85 infra.
71 GA. CODE ANN. § 13-207.1(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1980).
75 By granting to an executive branch official the power to license bank holding com-
pany activities, the Georgia statute risks creating an enforcement system that may be
discriminatory in practice. Cf. 100 S. Ct. at 2018-19 (Florida regulation found
discriminatory). But see Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978). See
also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
7' See Scott, supra note 2, at 1; text accompanying notes 1-3 supra. Comprehensive
federal regulation of bank holding company organization does not yet exist to replace state
regulations invalidated in light of Lewis. See text accompanying note 80 infra. See generally
12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1980).
" See 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1980).
"' See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 3700-3704 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 13-207 &
13-207.1 (Supp. 1980); see Hablutzel, supra note 1, at 679; Scott, supra note 2, at 1.
See notes 26-33 supra.
Regulation of specific activities of bank holding companies exist under appropriate
legislation, such as federal securities and banking laws. See 100 S. Ct. at 2016 n.7. There is
no present federal regulatory scheme, however, that supervises bank holding company
structure and organization. See id.; note 76 supra.
5, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
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isting regulatory controls on the banking industry,82 and amended the
BHC Act to include an eighteen-month prohibition on trust company ac-
tivities by bank holding companies.' The Lewis Court interpreted the
trust company provision to prohibit any such activity by bank holding
companies as a matter of federal law. 4 Thus, in the narrow area of trust
company subsidiaries Congress has regulated a specific non-banking ac-
tivity of bank holding companies and has preempted similar state regula-
tion.85
The banking industry is the focus of a variety of economic interests
and public policy concerns.88 State and federal governments often have
conflicting regulatory objectives. In addition, bank holding companies
operate in a climate of deregulation and economic instability." The
Supreme Court's interpretation of the BHC Act in Lewis will contribute
to the uncertainty in the existing bank holding company regulatory
structure."
BEVIN R. ALEXANDER, JR.
See id. at 142-45, 186-93 (§§ 201-210, 701-806) (amendments to existing banking law
include "phase-out" of maximum interest rate regulations (§ 202) and efforts to reduce ex-
pensive, paperwork-generating supervisory regulations (§ 802)).
' Id. at 189 (§ 712). The conference report failed to comment on the legislative purpose
in amending § 3(d), rather than placing the amendment in § 4. See H. CONF. REP. No. 96-842,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 83, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODF CONG. & AD. NEWS 896.
100 S. Ct. at 2022-24. See also note 88 infra.
Congress inserted the trust activity moratorium into § 3(d) rather than into § 4(c),
even though trust company activities are permissible closely-related non-banking activities.
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(4) (1980); HELLER. supra note 37, at 234. The 1980 amendment to §
3(d) suggests that Congress did not intend a gap to exist between § 3(d) and § 4(c). See text
accompanying notes 42 & 45 supra. At the same time, the statutory placement of the trust
activity amendment illustrates the narrow distinction between preemption by federal
regulation and a grant of federal power to the states. See 100 S. Ct. at 2021-22; Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 423-31 (1946); text accompanying note 22 supra. Although
Congress has not clarified the legislative intent underlying the trust activity restriction, the
Lewis Court's interpretation of the BHC Act is apparently different from that of Congress.
See 100 S. Ct. at 2021; H. CONF. REP. No. 96-842, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 83, reprinted in [1980]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 896; text accompanying notes 35-54 supra. Congress may
choose to restructure the relationship between § 3 and § 4, as interpreted in Lewis, and
thereby invalidate the Court's analysis of the BHC Act.
" See P. Laub, The Deregulation of Banking, THE DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING AND
SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 201 (L. Goldberg & J. White ed. 1979); M. JESSEE & S. SEELIG. BANK
HOLDING COMPANIES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 34, 74 (1977); note 88 infra.
I The Pennsylvania and Illinois legislatures have expressed an interest in preserving
the security of unit banking by prohibiting bank holding company organization. See text ac-
companying notes 61 & 72 supra. The Congress recognized a divergent national need for the
financial power of diversified bank holding company activities. See H. CONF. REP. No.
91-1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5561;
Bankamerica Corp. v. Board of Govs., 596 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979).
' See text accompanying notes 85 & 86 supra. See generally Bush, Inflationary
Economics, 119 TR. & EST. 34 (1980); Kreidmann, Inflation. Quest for Solutions, 25 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REV. 527 (1980).
" See text accompanying notes 85-88 supra.
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